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Abstract
Background: Adolescents with conduct and substance problems (‘‘Antisocial Substance Disorder’’ (ASD)) repeatedly engage
in risky antisocial and drug-using behaviors. We hypothesized that, during processing of risky decisions and resulting
rewards and punishments, brain activation would differ between abstinent ASD boys and comparison boys.
Methodology/Principal Findings: We compared 20 abstinent adolescent male patients in treatment for ASD with 20
community controls, examining rapid event-related blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) responses during functional
magnetic resonance imaging. In 90 decision trials participants chose to make either a cautious response that earned one
cent, or a risky response that would either gain 5 cents or lose 10 cents; odds of losing increased as the game progressed.
We also examined those times when subjects experienced wins, or separately losses, from their risky choices. We contrasted
decision trials against very similar comparison trials requiring no decisions, using whole-brain BOLD-response analyses of
group differences, corrected for multiple comparisons. During decision-making ASD boys showed hypoactivation in
numerous brain regions robustly activated by controls, including orbitofrontal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices, anterior
cingulate, basal ganglia, insula, amygdala, hippocampus, and cerebellum. While experiencing wins, ASD boys had
significantly less activity than controls in anterior cingulate, temporal regions, and cerebellum, with more activity nowhere.
During losses ASD boys had significantly more activity than controls in orbitofrontal cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex,
brain stem, and cerebellum, with less activity nowhere.
Conclusions/Significance: Adolescent boys with ASD had extensive neural hypoactivity during risky decision-making,
coupled with decreased activity during reward and increased activity during loss. These neural patterns may underlie the
dangerous, excessive, sustained risk-taking of such boys. The findings suggest that the dysphoria, reward insensitivity, and
suppressed neural activity observed among older addicted persons also characterize youths early in the development of
substance use disorders.
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Introduction
Some 200,000 adolescent admissions annually occur in
American substance-treatment programs [1]. Adolescent sub-
stance use disorders (SUD) are so strongly comorbid with
antisocial conduct disorder (CD) [2–4] that the combination
may be termed ‘‘antisocial substance disorder’’ (ASD). Both
antecedent genetic influences [5–8] and toxic effects of drugs
[9–12] may contribute to these behavioral problems, which often
persist for decades [13]. ASD’s great costs, both to those with the
disorder and to society, make it important to understand this
condition’s etiology.
‘‘Risky behaviors’’ are behaviors that may result unpredictably
in rewarding and/or adverse outcomes. Adolescents generally tend
to take more risks than adults, but in laboratories and in real life
ASD youths, even when abstinent, take more risks than other
adolescents [14,15]. Indeed, ASD’s symptoms of SUD and CD
(e.g., fire-setting, break-ins, and continued substance use despite
problems [16]) epitomize extreme risky behaviors. Of note, ASD’s
risky behaviors are not necessarily ‘‘impulsive’’, i.e., done quickly
without considering possible consequences. Indeed, they often
require sustained preparation, such as ‘‘casing’’ a building before
breaking in, or obtaining false identification to buy alcohol.
The excessive risky behaviors of ASD youths might result, first,
from aberrant neural processing of behavior-motivating rewards;
e.g., among normal adolescents a risk-taking propensity does
correlate with more reward-related activation of nucleus accum-
bens (NAc) [17] (also see [18]). Second, aberrant processing of
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behavior-inhibiting punishments could result in risky behaviors;
e.g., after punished responses in reversal learning, children with
psychopathic traits show abnormally increased neural activation in
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and caudate [19] (also see
[20]). Third, apart from initial processing of rewards or
punishments, impaired integration of reward-punishment infor-
mation in regions that decide on future behaviors could cause
excessive risky behavior; e.g., under risky conditions substance-
dependent adults under-recruit specialized conflict-monitoring
circuitry in posterior mesofrontal cortex [21]; also see [22,23].
To address these three possibilities, we asked whether ASD youths
under conditions of risk process decisions, rewards, or punishments
differently from community-comparison youths.
Only a few studies have compared brain activation in ASD
youths and controls. ASD youths did show greater activation in
amygdala and regions of the default network while performing the
Stroop task [24]. In a go/no-go task marijuana-using youths
(without CD) had more activation frontally (and elsewhere) than
controls [25]. Conversely, youths with familial risk for ASD had
less frontal activation than controls during a motor inhibition task
[26], perhaps like substance-involved adults who, when consider-
ing risky decisions, showed hypoactivity in brain regions
processing potential losses and response conflicts [21].
Structural alterations of brain have been associated with the
risk-taking of ASD youngsters, even among those merely
vulnerable to ASD through family history. Youngsters with CD
reportedly have reduced volume in insula and amygdala [27], and
in temporal lobes, hippocampus, and vmPFC [28]. Compared
with controls, alcohol-naı̈ve sons of alcoholic men reportedly have
widespread gray-matter volume reductions, the severity of which
correlates with the severity of inattention, impulsivity, hyperactiv-
ity, and conduct problems [29]. Aggression and defiance
negatively correlate with right ACC gray-matter volume among
community boys not selected for ASD [30], while impulsivity
negatively correlates with vmPFC volume [31].
Because ASD youths combine antisocial conduct problems with
SUD, recent publications suggest partially conflicting possibilities
for the neural underpinnings of their problems. First, like adults
with antisocial or psychopathic traits (but substance-free) [32],
ASD youths’ repeated risk-taking might occur because they
experience increased dopaminergic response to reward anticipation.
Among antisocial adults impaired amygdala and vmPFC function
also are thought [23] to reduce responses to punishment or loss.
Increased response to reward and decreased response to
punishment could cause excessive pursuit of exciting rewards with
failure to inhibit behaviors that may be punished.
Alternatively, reviewing human and animal studies, Koob and
Volkow [33] suggest that repeated intoxication-withdrawal cycles
from addictive drugs are associated with decreased dopaminergic
response to reward, due to increased stimulation thresholds in
compromised reward circuits (see also [18]). These processes
would produce ‘‘reward insensitivity’’, reducing motivation for
non-drug stimuli. Koob and Volkow [33] also indicate that
chronic drug use disrupts frontal activity in ACC, OFC, and
DLPFC, a disruption continuing well into protracted abstinence.
Because those areas contribute to decision-making and behavioral
inhibition, such disruption would facilitate recurring risk-taking
and relapses. These authors further propose that repeated
intoxication-withdrawal cycles activate a brain stress system
mediated by corticotropin releasing factor (CRF) and other
neurotransmitters [33]. They suggest that in human addicts
hypodopaminergic reward insensitivity and stress activation
present as subjective dysphoria, a ‘‘negative emotional state’’ that
continues long into protracted abstinence (Fig. 1). Relapses at least
briefly would relieve that dysphoria, negatively reinforcing further
drug use (Fig. 1 and [34]).
With such conflicting suggestions in the literature, we could not
make a directional hypothesis for this study. Thus, we simply
hypothesized that, as adolescent boys repeatedly decide between
doing a risky or a cautious behavior, and as they experience wins
or losses from their risky choices, functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) will show that youths with ASD have different
brain activation patterns than community-control boys. Unlike
some previous adolescent studies, our z-shim procedure [35]
allowed good visualization of orbitofrontal regions that are
important in processing reward and punishment [18]. Our results
strongly supported our hypothesis.
Methods
Participants and Assessments
Ethics Statement: Written informed consent (adults) and assent
(minors) was obtained from all research subjects. The Colorado
Multiple Institutional Review Board approved all procedures.
Patients and controls were males, ages 14–18 years (inclusive)
with IQ$80, without known MRI contraindications (claustropho-
bia, orthodontic braces, color blindness, ferric metal in the body),
and without history of unconsciousness .15 minutes, serious
neurological illness, or neurosurgery. They and their parents spoke
sufficient English for consenting. After explanation of procedures
18-year-old subjects provided written informed consent for
participation; those ,18 years old provided written assent and
parents provided consent. Subjects were paid $50, won a mean of
$6.25 more in the behavioral task, and earned $3 more if head
movement was ,2mm during the MRI.
Patients’ inclusion criteria were: in treatment in our programs
for youths (most referred by criminal-justice or social-service
Figure 1. Schematic illustration of dysphoria induced by
repeated intoxication-withdrawal cycles. Each intoxication leads
to a subjective ‘‘high’’, with enhanced response to reward due to
reduced reward thresholds in medial forebrain bundle. Each acute
withdrawal event results in subjective dysphoria with reduced response
to reward due to elevated reward thresholds. Frequent cycle repetitions
gradually suppress subjective ‘‘highs’’, deepening dysphoria by further
raising reward thresholds. Increasingly, the drug is used to escape
dysphoria and achieve normal mood. During abstinence, mood
recovers very slowly. (Based on Koob and Volkow [33]).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012835.g001
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agencies and on probation); serious antisocial problems including
DSM-IV [16] CD symptoms; DSM-IV [16] substance abuse or
dependence on a non-nicotine substance; and multisubstance
urine and saliva tests drug-free $7 days before assessment.
Patients’ exclusion criteria were: psychosis; current high risk of
suicide, violence, or fire setting; or in treatment and abstinent $30
days (to minimize treatment effects on risk-taking). We obtained
assent/consent on 28 patients, excluding 1 because of past
embedded metal, 2 for not meeting substance diagnostic criteria,
4 for motion during imaging, and 1 for brain abnormalities noted
during scanning. Twenty others completed all procedures.
To maximize similarity with patients we recruited controls in zip-
code areas from which previous patients had come. One was
referred by a previous control. All others were contacted by a
telemarketing company that phoned, described the project, and
invited families with possibly-qualifying children to accept a call
from the researchers, who then met with the youth and a parent or
guardian to explain the project, inviting written parental consent,
and youth assent or consent, to participate. Regarding age,
gender, English-language skills, and IQ, inclusion criteria were the
same as patients’. Exclusion criteria were: court convictions
(except minor traffic or curfew offenses); substance-related arrests,
treatment, school-expulsions; obvious psychosis; physical illness;
urine or breath tests containing non-prescribed substances a few
days, or immediately, before scans; meeting criteria for DSM-IV
CD in the last year; or non-tobacco substance dependence. As
samples accumulated, we skewed control recruitment (e.g., seeking
older boys) to maintain patient-control comparability. Twenty-five
control candidates provided assent/consent, but we excluded 1 for
a substance-positive test, 2 for MRI-incompatible metal, 1 for
motion during imaging, and 1 for signal loss from a large sinus; 20
others completed all procedures.
Psychosocial assessments were completed several days before
fMRI’s. Senior staff trained Bachelor-level interviewers and
examined all records for accuracy. Typical interview time was
2 hrs for controls and 3 hrs for patients (who reported more
symptoms). Assessments were: Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL)
and Youth Self Report (YSR) [36,37] for symptom severity of
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), anxiety, and
depression; Diagnostic Interview Schedule for Children (DISC-
IV) [16,37,38] for CD symptoms and diagnoses; Composite
International Diagnostic Interview-Substance Abuse Module
(CIDI-SAM) [37,39–41] for DSM-IV abuse or dependence for
11 substance categories; Peak Aggression Rating Scale [37];
Carroll Self-Rating Scale for depression severity [37,42,43];
Synergy Interview [37] for education, legal issues, and medical/
psychological history; Modified Hollingshead-Redlich Social Class
Rating [44]; Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI)
[45] Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning for IQ estimates; Eysenck
Junior Impulsiveness Scale [46]; and handedness preference [47].
Treating therapists tested patients’ urine about weekly for
substances. Researchers tested patients and controls with urine
(AccuTestTM) and saliva (AlcoScreenTM) dipsticks about 1 week,
and immediately, before scanning.
Estimating Abstinence Duration
At treatment admission 14 patients, most referred from strictly
controlled environments, produced an admission urine sample free of
unprescribed drugs; 12 of those also denied any substance use in the
previous 30 days and continued producing substance-free urine
samples. For those 12 we estimated abstinence duration as: (30 days) +
(number of days between admission and imaging). For all other
patients abstinence duration was the length in days of a continuous
series of during-treatment negative urine samples before imaging.
Of the four tobacco-experienced control subjects, one reported
using tobacco regularly. All 20 patients reported smoking in the
last 6 months, but 14 were now in a residential treatment program
that vigorously suppressed smoking. Thus, we estimated that 6
non-residential patients and one control had used tobacco in the
few days before imaging. No subjects smoked during the 1 hr pre-
MRI training.
Behavioral Tasks and Analyses
In a mock scanner subjects practiced our Colorado Balloon
Game (CBG; Fig. 2), which is conceptually different from the
Balloon Analogue Risk Task that we previously employed with
similar patients [15]. We then conducted rapid event-related fMRI
of neural processing (a) as subjects decided between doing a risky
or a cautious behavior, and (b) as they experienced wins or losses
from risky behaviors. ‘‘Decision Balloons’’ (DecBa) were test trials
that forced a choice between doing a risky or a cautious behavior
and then provided relatively large monetary wins or losses after
risky behaviors. ‘‘Directed Balloons’’ (DirBa) were ‘‘baseline
comparison’’ trials that required no decisions and provided only
a small monetary reward for following a direction. DecBa and
DirBa shared identical motor responses and almost identical visual
and auditory stimuli (except for the initial full, vs. half, yellow light
(Fig. 2B)), but only DecBa forced decisions and gave larger
rewards or losses for risky decisions. Thus, we reasoned that
subtracting baseline DirBa brain activation from DecBa activation
should remove visual-, auditory-, and motor-related activation,
while highlighting decision-related, and win-or-loss-related, acti-
vation.
Imaging Neural Processing
Goggles and earphones delivered CBG’s stimuli (Fig. 2A,B).
The CBG presented 90 pairs of balloons, each pair including one
DecBa (‘‘You decide which button to press’’) and one DirBa (‘‘The
computer will play the game. You don’t need to decide anything’’).
Subjects responded with right and left index fingers on fiber-optic
button response pads. Balloons within a pair usually were
separated by balloons from other pairs (average 2.9, range 1–5,
balloons, programmed with ‘‘optseq2’’ [48]. Each subject’s session
was divided into 3 runs, each presenting 30 identically-ordered
DecBa-and-DirBa balloon pairs. Each DecBa or DirBa trial ended
with a fixation screen (Fig. 2B), usually 2 sec, but in each of the
subject’s 3 runs four trials were ‘‘jittered’’ to 4 sec. Subjects
received the amount on the counter at game’s end; that amount
could not fall below $3.00.
Across the 90 DecBa trials the reward schedule changed. To
model real-life shifting of reward contingencies, risky right
responses were very likely to be rewarded early, and punished
later, in the game (Fig. 2C). Moreover, risky-response punishments
(10 cents) were larger than rewards (5 cents) to further encourage
gradual shifting from risky-right to cautious-left responding.
Subjects only were advised, ‘‘Try to guess whether [the balloon]
will pop from what the last few whole-yellow light balloons did. If
the last few popped, maybe this one will pop. If the last few didn’t
pop, maybe this one won’t pop.’’
Imaging Decision-Making. During DecBa’s 4-sec yellow
light (Fig. 2B), subjects decided whether they would make a left or
a right response when the green light came on. Since the yellow-
light preceded responding, these 2 TRs reflected processing of
decision, not response. DecBa was the test trial and DirBa was the
‘‘baseline comparison’’ trial; DirBa, unlike DecBa, required only
compliance with a simple direction and no risky-vs.-cautious
decision-making.
Antisocial Brains, Decisions
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Figure 2. Colorado Balloon Game. A. Decision-Balloon screen, yellow light illuminated. Counter initially $5. B. Events during presentation of 90
paired trials, each Decision Balloon (DecBa) followed by a Directed Balloon (DirBa). Top: timing (seconds). Colored circles represent stoplight lights.
DecBa begins (B, upper): yellow light illuminated 4 sec, subject decides to press left (L) or right (R) button. Green light (0.5 sec), subject executes
response. Red light, consequence appears (3.5 sec). Risky right press consequence, either: (a) ‘‘smiley face’’, expanding balloon, puffing sounds,
counter adds 5 cents, or (b) ‘‘pop’’ sound, shrinking balloon, ‘‘frowney face’’, counter loses 10 cents. Cautious left press consequence: +1 cent on
counter, dull ‘‘thud’’ sound, unchanged balloon. Then, ‘‘jittered’’ fixation. DirBa’s (B, lower) are identical to their paired DecBa’s except: only half of
initial yellow light illuminates, signaling (i) start of a DirBa and (ii) button to press during green light (e.g., right illumination – press right) – the same
button chosen during preceding paired DecBa. Green-light press on directed button: +2 cents on counter. Then balloon repeats the consequence
(puff up, pop, or no change) of previous paired DecBa; subject was told that DirBa consequences would not affect earnings. Finally, jittered fixation
screen. C. During DecBa, declining proportion of right presses programmed to win as game progresses. Mostly pressing left later in game saves
earnings. D. Visual Analog Scales (VAS). After sessions subjects rated their opinions about the stated questions on 100mm lines. Marked positions
represent all-subject means; groups did not differ significantly. Upper VAS: subjects’ understanding of decision-making source for DecBa vs. DirBa.
Lower VAS: Different emotional responses to puff-ups or pops of DecBa, vs. DirBa. E. Mean numbers, DecBa selections.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012835.g002
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Imaging Reward-Punishment Processing. After the 4-sec
yellow light (Fig. 2B) subjects responded during the 0.5-sec green
light, and then during the 3.5-sec red light they observed the
consequences (risky right-response win: smiley face, puff-up sound,
balloon enlarges, counter increases 5 cents; risky right-response loss:
frowney face, pop sound, balloon shrinks, counter decreases
10 cents; cautious left response: no face, dull thud sound, no change in
balloon, counter increases 1 cent). Hence, combining the 2 TR’s
that spanned the green- and red-light periods (4 sec total; Fig. 2B)
permitted us to assess the processing of reward or punishment
(across-subject mean: 29 wins, and separately, 23 losses from 52
right presses (Fig. 2E)).
In the mock-scanner practice session subjects learned that
during DirBa’s red-light periods the counter increased 2 cents if
the subject responded on the signaled side, regardless of
subsequent audio-visual consequences (Fig. 2B); the latter were
identical in each DecBa-DirBa pair. DirBa’s always-predictable 2-
cent reward for compliance was risk-free, certain, and consider-
ably smaller than the 5-cent ‘‘win’’ reward, or the 10-cent ‘‘loss’’
punishment, that followed DecBa’s risky choices. Accordingly, to
assess win-or-loss related activation we subtracted DirBa activation
from DecBa activation during the 4-sec green-and-red light period
(Fig. 2B). In these analyses the first 0.5 sec included green-light
motor responding, but in each pair of trials the DecBa and DirBa
green-light stimuli and responses were identical (Fig. 2B), as were
the red-light audio-visual stimuli. The only DecBa-DirBa differ-
ence was the meaning of those red-light stimuli (DirBa, 2-cent gain.
DecBa risky response: 5 cent win or 10 cent loss; DecBa cautious
response: 1 cent gain). Thus, subtracting DirBa activation from
DecBa activation was designed to cancel out green-light-related
activation, while highlighting activation associated with experi-
encing a win or a loss.
Other Data. We recorded occurrence of left or right
responses and reaction times (from green-light onset to
response), as well as the resulting consequences (i.e., counter
changes and the balloon’s puff, pop, or no-change). Post-session
debriefings asked about in-magnet experiences, game strategies,
etc. On Visual Analogue Scales (VAS; Fig. 2D) subjects rated (a)
the extent to which they or the computer made the left-right
response decision for DecBa and for DirBa, and (b) their happy-
sad reactions to balloon puff-ups or pops. T-tests and chi-square
tests compared the groups on demographic and clinical variables,
and on debriefing responses regarding DecBa and DirBa. Mixed
models examined group and run differences (see below) in CBG’s
Total risky right presses, and last-session risky right presses.
Image Acquisition
In a 3T General Electric MRI scanner, with stimuli synchronized
to trigger pulses, subjects first observed a video during a 3D T1
anatomical scan (IR-SPGR, TR = 9 ms, TE = 1.9 ms, TI = 500 ms
flip angle = 10u, matrix = 2566256, FOV = 220 mm2, 124 1.7 mm
thick coronal slices; 9 min 12 sec).
Sessions then presented 90 paired DecBa-and-DirBa trials,
divided into 3 runs. Each echo-planar (EPI) run (TR = 2000ms,
TE = 26 ms, flip angle = 70u, FOV = 220 mm2, 642 matrix, 36
slices, 4 mm thick, no gap, angled parallel to the planum
sphenoidale) lasted 10 min, 23 sec, and had 30 paired DecBa-
and-DirBa presentations. One-minute rest images (abstract nature
drawing) separated the 3 runs.
Individual trials were discounted if the subject failed to respond
behaviorally during the 0.5 sec green light. Data from individual
trials with spike-like movement of the head .2 mm were replaced
with dummy fixation data. The subject was excluded from
analyses if 10 or more trials in a 30-trial run failed those criteria.
The 50-min session ended with T1 FLAIR images (T1-weighted
spin-echo data set: 31 slices of part head, matrix = 2566192,
NEX = 2, TE/TR/TI = 7.3ms/2000ms/860ms; imaging time =
4 min, 25 sec). Additionally, we acquired one IR-EPI (TR =
2000 ms, TE = 26 ms) volume (with excellent contrast between
gray and white matter) to improve coregistration between EPIs
and the IR-SPGR.
Our fast z-shimmed image acquisition was designed to reduce
inferior frontal susceptibility artifact [35]. Compensation was
applied only to a few slices covering the inferior frontal region to
improve temporal resolution in a whole brain scan. Slice-
acquisition order assured effective, constant repetition time in
both the z-shim slices and other slices. Moreover, we applied z-
shim compensation to 5 of the 31 slice locations in the OFC
region. To optimize the amplitude of z-shim compensation
gradient, Gc, we ran on each subject a trial scan with 3 different
Gc values (i.e., 0.55, 0.70, and 0.85Gnull), where Gnull is an
amplitude that nulls the MRI signal in regions without
susceptibility effect. We determined that a Gc of 0.70 Gnull gave
optimal signal recovery in the ventral-medial OFC. This Gc value
produced robust OFC activation.
Image Analysis
Data preprocessing included motion correction, coregistration
to structural images, normalization to standard Montreal Neuro-
logical Institute (MNI) space, and smoothing. For within-subject
fMRI analyses we fitted preprocessed data with the general linear
model (GLM) of Statistical Parametric Mapping [49] software,
filtering low frequency noise, correcting for temporal autocorre-
lation, and convolving with a single canonical HRF signal. A 128-s
high pass filter removed signal drift and low-frequency fluctuation.
The GLM model included these trial periods: decision, outcome
(win or loss), and fixation. We generated single-subject contrast
maps with SPM-2, analyzing brain-function differences in
contrasts of interest (e.g. DecBa vs. DirBa) as fixed effects.
For between-subject whole-brain analyses, we compared
groups’ single-subject contrast maps generated by SPM2 using
SPM5’s random effects models. We used SPM5’s ANCOVA to
adjust all fMRI analyses for age and IQ (IQ mean: patients 97.1;
controls 104.9, t (38) = 2.67; p = 0.011) before producing final
statistical maps.
Agreeing that ‘‘research needs to move beyond the simple
identification of single structures’’ [50], we conducted whole-brain,
rather than region-of-interest, analyses, considering all structures
exceeding cluster-defined thresholds. We expected to have greatest
power in analyses that examined DecBa-DirBa differences in a
single group of 20 subjects, considering all 90 trials together. For
those analyses we controlled for false positive results with voxel-
level family-wise error (FWE) correction (pcorr.,0.05).
In analyses expected to have less power (comparing 2 groups,
and/or examining fewer trials), we used the cluster- level FWE
correction (AFNI’s AlphaSim program [51]), as used previously by
us [24] and by others publishing in PLoS One or other excellent
journals (e.g., [52–57]). In comparison with voxel-level FWE,
cluster-level FWE controls for false-positive results and achieves
pcorr,0.05 by simultaneously requiring a less significant difference
in activation at each individual voxel (puncorr.,0.005), but also
requiring a simulation-determined minimum number of contigu-
ous activated voxels in each cluster. In other words, voxel-level
FWE can identify an intensely activated, single-voxel ‘‘hotspot’’;
cluster-level FWE identifies multivoxel ‘‘warmspots’’ that, al-
though less intensively activated, must be larger and so (like the
voxel-level focus) would only occur by chance in whole brain at a
multiple-comparisons-corrected probability of pcorr,0.05. Con-
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sidering our 6 mm full-width-half-maximum smoothing, 1000
Monte Carlo simulations estimated the overall significance level
(probability of a false detection) for thresholding the 3D functional
z-map image over the entire brain volume, regardless of activation
within that map. These simulations indicated that requiring cluster
size #97 voxels, and each voxel with an activation difference at
p(uncorr) = 0.005, provided a whole-brain family-wise corrected
false positive rate p(FWE-corr) = .05.
We examined potential confounds in our data with SPM’s
‘‘glass-brain’’ images that show all beyond-threshold areas of
activation. Those images were statistically adjusted with two
continuous measures (ADHD severity (from CBCL) and depres-
sion severity (Carroll rating)). Three other potential confounds
were categorical. For them we re-analyzed the data after excluding
3 left-handed subjects, and separately 7 current tobacco smokers,
and separately after excluding subjects reporting prescribed
medication use around the time of scanning (6 medicated patients
(A used amphetamine-dextroamphetamine and risperidone; B,
fexofenadine; C, fluoxetine, quetiapine; D, unidentified ‘‘ulcer
drug’’; E, methylphenidate; F, unidentified ‘‘asthma inhaler’’) and
4 medicated controls (A and B, amphetamine-dextroamphet-
amine; C, albuterol; D, topiramate)).
Names for clusters’ regions of maximum activation follow the
NRW Research atlas [58]. Our ‘‘broad regions’’ include parts or
all of Brodmann areas (BA) 10–14 and 47 in OFC [18]; portions of
BA 6, 8, 9, and 46 in DLPFC [58]; inferior BA 8, and BA 44 and
45 in ventrolateral PFC (VLPFC) [59]; and portions of BA 6, 8, 9,
and 10, and BA 24, 25, and 32 in medial prefrontal cortex (Med
PFC) [60,61]; BA 10 and 11, and the inferior and subgenual
regions of ACC (BA 24 and 32) in vmPFC [23]. The atlas does not
identify NAc; we considered it bounded by MNI coordinates
x = (6) 4 to 15; y = 0 to 22; z = 2 to 210 [62]. Our procedures
cannot resolve ventral tegmental area (VTA) and adjacent
substantia nigra (SN) from surrounding structures, so we labeled
the region within coordinates x = 614, y = 14 to 28, z = 24 to
216 as ‘‘Midbrain (SN/VTA)’’ [63]; our ‘‘y’’ polarity is reversed
from this reference. Rarely, SPM5 placed a cluster outside of gray
matter (e.g., in white matter), perhaps because of registration
errors. If the cluster was #3mm from gray matter, we labeled it in
the nearest gray matter; if it was .3mm, we do not report it.
Some of our data are expressed in standard SPM activation
units. The mean activation of all brain voxels (white and gray
matter) during the entire session is normalized at 100 percent, and
mean activation in each region during DecBa, and separately
during DirBa, is scaled proportionately in percentages. For
example, if in some cortical region, patients’ mean activation
during DecBa is 180 percent of their mean activation in all brain
voxels, and if their mean activation in that region during DirBa is
179 percent of mean activation in all brain voxels, then patients’
mean DecBa-minus-DirBa activation difference in that region is
180-179 = 1 SPM activation unit.
Results
Demographics
All patients had been referred to our program for youths with
serious antisocial and substance problems. Fourteen were in
residential treatment, 4 in day-treatment, and 2 were outpatients.
Patients and controls did not differ significantly in age or racial
distribution (Table 1). However, patients’ mean socioeconomic
status score (equating to Social Class IV, lower middle class) was
significantly lower than controls’ score (III, upper middle class). As
expected patients had significantly worse (Table 1) aggression and
impulsiveness scores, conduct problems, number of CD symptoms,
prevalence of CD, anxiety and depression (dysphoria) scores,
attention problems, estimated mean IQ, number of SUD
symptoms, and prevalence of SUD. Patients had many more
legal problems.
Although symptom minimization is not uncommon in our
patients’ self-reports, 19 reported symptoms meeting criteria for
DSM-IV conduct disorder (Table 1). Fourteen reported symptoms
qualifying for DSM-IV substance dependence on at least one drug
other than nicotine, and the other six reported symptoms
qualifying for non-nicotine substance abuse without dependence.
We conclude that these patients had ASD.
No subjects’ urine or saliva contained alcohol or non-prescribed
drugs just before scans. We estimated that patients were abstinent
a mean of 38.6 (range 9–59) days before imaging. In the 30 days
before imaging one control reported using alcohol on 2 days and
another used cannabis on one day. We estimated that 6 patients
and one control had used tobacco in the few days before imaging;
they could use tobacco ad libitum before coming to the laboratory,
but abstained for one hour before scans.
Behavior
A post-fMRI VAS (Fig. 2D, upper line) showed that subjects
understood that decisions were made by them in DecBa and not in
DirBa (0mm = ‘‘I told myself’’; 100mm = ‘‘the computer told me’’;
mean (6SD) scores (mm): DecBa, patients 6.5 (3.8), controls 12.1
(3.8); DirBa, patients 95.2 (5.0), controls 88.0 (5.0); DecBa or
DirBa trial type F(1,38) = 333.8, p,0.0001; group NS). Another
VAS (Fig 2D, lower line) showed that, as intended, the puff-ups or
pops of DecBa produced stronger emotions than those of DirBa
(0mm = ‘‘really, really happy’’; 100mm = ‘‘really, really sad’’.
DecBa: DirBa x Puff: Pop interaction, F = 47.6 (df = 1,3);
p,0.0001; patient-control main effect, NS). Hence, the data
indicated that subjects clearly understood the different expecta-
tions of DecBa and DirBa trials, and that the rewards and
punishments elicited the expected emotional responses.
Patients and controls did not differ in mean reaction times
(Table 2). However, patients failed to respond within the 0.5 sec
green-light limit on DecBa slightly but significantly more often
than controls (patient mean 2.5 (6SD1.8) trials, controls 1.4
(61.4), t(38) = 2.03, p = 0.049).
Considering all subjects together, the number of risky right
presses decreased significantly across the three 30 trial runs. Mixed
model analysis of risky right presses evaluated potential group, run,
and group x run effects. Only the run effect was significant: F
(1,40) = 49.0, p,0.0001. The estimated mean decrease was 7.3
(1.0) presses.
We thought that patients, compared to controls, might make
more right presses overall, and especially on the last 30 DecBa
trials. However, the groups did not differ in overall right responses
(patients’ mean (6SD) 52.2 (2.3); controls’ 52.4 (1.9), t(38) = 0.07;
NS), nor in right responses in the final 30-trial run (patients 15.1
(4.8); controls 15.0 (3.7), t (38) = 20.07; NS).
With no differences in right pressing, the groups did not differ
significantly in wins (patients 28.3 (5.2); controls 29.9 (4.6); t
(38) = 21.0; p = 0.32) or losses (patients 23.8 (6.0); controls 22.5
(4.8); t(38) = 0.76; p = 0.45). This similar win-loss experience helps
in evaluating neural activation differences, since neither group
experienced more frustration-inducing losses.
Brain Activation During Decision-Making
In DecBa trials subjects decided about their next response
during yellow-light periods, and in DirBa trials they were directed
on how to respond during yellow-light periods. In many frontal
and subcortical regions deciding recruited significantly more
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activation than following a direction. This was true for controls
(Table 3; in this and each subsequent table, a footnote shows the
contrast analyzed) and for patients, although patients activated
many fewer voxels and regions (Table 4). The high t-values in
these single-group, all-trial, FWE analyses reflect their consider-
able power. A formal two-group comparison of regions differently
activated by controls and patients had less power than one-group
analyses, and the stringent FWE procedure found no group
differences. Therefore, we used a simulation procedure (see
Methods) to determine a cluster-size threshold ($97 contiguous
voxels, each at puncorr = 0.005); such clusters were unlikely
(p,0.05) to occur by chance in our whole-brain analyses.
By that analysis, decision-making (compared to following a
direction) activated a large set of regions significantly more among
controls than among patients (Table 5; Fig. 3 (Decision)).
Conversely, in the reverse contrast no brain regions activated
more in patients than in controls. The discrepancy (controls.pa-
tients, 6233 voxels (Table 5); patients.controls, 0 voxels) strongly
Table 1. Subject characteristics.
Patient Control Test p-value
N = 20 N = 20
Demographic and Psychiatric
Mean Age (SD) 16.5 (1.0) 16.5 (1.6) t-test NS
Caucasian (n) 12 15 chi-square NS
Non-Caucasian (n) 8 5
SES Score: Mean (SD) 47(18) 35(16) t-test p,.03
Social Class III IV
Aggression Score: Mean (SD) 5.7 (3.2) 0.5 (1.1) M-W U p,.0005
Eysenck Impulsiveness Score: Mean (SD) 11.9 (6.0) 6.7 (4.5) t-test p,.005
Youth Self Report: CP Mean (SD) 69.0 (7.7) 53.8 (4.6) t-test p,.0005
CD Lifetime Symptom: Mean (SD) 6.8 (2.3) 0.5 (0.6) M-W U p,.0005
CD Lifetime Diagnosis (n1) 19 1 chi-square p,.0005
CBCL, YSR2, Anx-Dep t-score: Mean (SD) 57.4 (8.6) 52.0 (7.3) M-W U p,0.007
CBCL, YSR2, Att-Prob Scale t-score: Mean (SD) 58.3 (8.2) 53.5 (4.5) t-test p = 0.029
Carroll Depression Rating Score: Mean (SD) 8.5 (6.7) 4.1 (3.8) M-W U p,.02
IQ full-scale t-score: Mean (SD) 97.1 (9.3) 104.9 (9.0) t-test p,.02
Sub Dep Symptoms, Across Drugs: Mean (SD) 12.4 (7.2) 0.2 (.67) M-W U p,.0005
Substance Use Disorders3,4
Tobacco Dependence 13 1 chi-square p,.0005
Alcohol Abuse 8 0 Fisher Exact p,.004
Alcohol Dependence 8 0 Fisher Exact p,.004
Cannabis Abuse 7 0 Fisher Exact p,.009
Cannabis Dependence 10 0 chi-square p,.0005
Cocaine Abuse 2 0 Fisher Exact NS
Cocaine Dependence 2 0 Fisher Exact NS
Club Drugs Abuse 3 0 Fisher Exact NS
Club Drug Dependence 4 0 Fisher Exact NS
Hallucinogen Abuse 2 0 Fisher Exact NS
Amphetamines Dependence 2 0 Fisher Exact NS
Hallucinogen Dependence 1 0 Fisher Exact NS
Legal Problems5
Lifetime Court Appearances: Mean (SD) 11 (11) 0
Lifetime Admissions to Detention or Jail: Mean (SD) 3 (4) 0
Days on Probation, Last 6 Months: Mean (SD) 139 (70) 0
Abbreviations
Att-Prob, Attention Problems Scale. Anx-Dep, Anxious-Depressed Scale. CBCL, Child Behavior Checklist. CD, Conduct Disorder. CP, Conduct Problems t-score. M-W U,
Mann-Whitney U test. SES, Socioeconomic Status. Sub Dep, Substance Dependence Symptoms. YSR, Youth Self-Report.
Footnotes
1No controls met DSM-IV’s past-year CD diagnostic criteria.
2For one patient with no Child Behavior Checklist, Youth Self Report score was substituted.
3For drugs not listed, no known cases.
4Multiple disorders in some subjects, so numbers sum .20.
5No statistical tests, due to lack of variance in control subjects.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012835.t001
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supports the conclusion that patients had less activation than
controls during risky decision-making.
To illustrate sources of group differences, Fig. 4 shows each
group’s mean DecBa-minus-DirBa activation difference (not
adjusted for age or IQ) for each cluster in Table 3. In some
regions both groups had more activation during decision-making
(DecBa) than while following a direction (DirBa), but that
difference was significantly greater among controls. Strikingly,
however, in some regions patients’ (but not controls’) values were
negative, indicating less activation during the decision-requiring
DecBa than after the simple directions of DirBa.
To test whether patients’ negative DecBa-minus-DirBa differ-
ences in Fig. 4 were due to abnormally high DirBa values in
patients, we examined between-group differences in DirBa
activation within the regions listed in Fig. 4. For each subject
during DirBa, the mean activation within each region of interest
was normalized (i.e., expressed in ‘‘SPM activation units’’ (see
Methods)). We then conducted between-group t-tests on those
SPM activation values. In no brain regions did patients’ DirBa
values significantly exceed those of controls (data not shown). This
suggests that, in comparison to controls, patients’ negative DecBa-
minus-DirBa values were due to reduced DecBa activation, rather
than to enhanced DirBa activation.
Brain Activation While Experiencing Wins or Losses
In the 90 DecBa trials subjects averaged 52 risky right
responses, producing a mean of about 29 5-cent wins and 23
Table 2. Mean (SD) reaction times, msec.a
Control Patient t-value p
DecBab 257 (30) 261 (26) 20.47 NS
DirBac 275 (28) 273 (31) 0.30 NS
Footnotes
aFrom green-light onset to response.
bAll Decision Balloons with response during green-light period.
cAll Directed Balloons with response during green-light period.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012835.t002
Table 3. Controls’ loci of activation during decision-making.A,B
Structure Brodmann Area or SideC Activated Voxels Maximum ActivationD t
x y z
Sup & Mid Fr Gy Mainly R 9, 10 293 36 54 10 19.1
Sup Fr Gy Mainly R 10 65 26 52 32 11.5
Mid Fr Gy L 10 16 230 44 30 9.3
Mid Fr Gy R 9 44 36 30 40 10.6
Med Fr Gy R9 15 22 36 28 7.7
ACCG Mainly R 24, 32 1776G 6 22 40 15.1
Med Fr Gy to Sup Fr GyG L, R 6, 8, 9 4 34 36 18.0
Sup Fr Gy (Pre-SMA)G Mainly R 6 2 10 62 12.6
Inf Fr GyH R, L 45, 47 R 3260H; L 216H 36 24 210 12.9
InsulaH R, L 13 40 18 2 11.7
N AcH R,L 12 14 22 11.7
CaudateH R, L 6 14 10 14.4
PutamenH R, L 214 6 24 12.1
Midbrain (SN, VTA)H R, L 10 212 214 11.0
ThalamusH R, L 34 6 212 14 13.7
Post Cing Gy R 51 2 226 30 9.4
Cereb Tonsil L 39 214 252 248 11.9
Cereb Ant LobeI R 43I 6 260 236 10.1
Uvula VermisI R 2 264 238 8.9
Cereb Tuber, Tonsil L 194 234 264 238 11.1
Clusters ,10 voxelsE - 54 - - - -
Total Activated Voxels - 6100 - - - -
Abbreviations
ACC, anterior cingulate cortex. Ant, anterior. Cereb, cerebellar. Cing, cingulate. Ctr, controls. DecBa, Decision Balloons. DirBa, Directed Balloons. Gy, gyrus. Inf, inferior. L,
left. Med, medial. Mid, middle. N Ac, nucleus accumbens. Occ, occipital. Par, parietal. Post, posterior. Pt, patient. R, right. Sec, secondary. SMA, supplementary motor area.
SN, substantia nigra. Sup, superior. Temp, temporal. Uncorr, uncorrected for multiple comparisons. VTA, ventral tegmental area.
Footnotes
AProcedure for determining significance: voxel-level family-wise error correction (pcorr,0.05).
BContrast examined: (DecBa)Ctr - (DirBa)Ctr.
CIf bilateral, the largest maximum is shown.
DMontreal Neurological Institute coordinates, mm from anterior commissure.
ECombined volume of all clusters comprising ,10 voxels.
G-JRegions bearing the same superscript comprise one activated cluster.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012835.t003
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10-cent losses (Fig. 2E). We contrasted DecBa’s 4-sec green-and-
red light periods with those of DirBa, which paid 2 cents for each
directed response. We analyzed wins, and separately losses, finding
very distinct patterns in the patients and controls.
In the DecBa-minus-DirBa contrast, controls as a group
significantly activated many structures, involving over 13,000
voxels, while patients activated fewer structures and about half as
many voxels (Tables 6, 7). In a formal comparison seeking regions
more activated by controls than patients, several regions and many
voxels activated significantly (Table 8; Fig. 3 (Win)); the opposite
contrast (patients.controls) found no regions activating signifi-
cantly. These observations indicate that controls were more
sensitive to wins than patients.
In controls losses (Table 9) activated fewer structures and voxels
than wins (Table 6). Moreover, unlike wins, losses actually
activated slightly fewer voxels in controls (Table 9) than in
patients (Table 10). Indeed, in formal comparisons of the two
groups we found no voxels more activated in controls than in
patients, while the patient.control contrast found many activated
structures and voxels (Table 11; Fig. 3 (Loss)); the largest cluster
was in prefrontal cortex. These findings indicate that patients were
more sensitive to losses than controls.
Possible Confounds
Compared with controls, patients’ neural function was reduced
during decision-making and wins, and enhanced during losses, and
we sought confounds that might explain these differences. ‘‘Glass
brains’’ (Fig. 5), 2-dimensional shadowgrams of all activated areas,
obscure details but visually summarize important large-scale
patterns. The shadowgram in Fig. 5, Cell 1A (Row 1, Column
A), presents the data of Table 5 (Decision period, all trials,
control.patient activation regions), showing numerous activated
regions. Cell 1B shows the reverse (patient.control) contrast, and
no regions activate. The stark differences between Cells 1A and 1B
persisted when we simultaneously adjusted brain activity for
ratings of depression and ADHD severity (Fig. 5, Cells 2A, 2B); or
after we excluded 6 patients and 1 control thought to be current,
regular cigarette smokers (Cells 3A, 3B); or after exclusion of 6
patients and 4 controls using prescription medications (Cells 4A,
4B); or after exclusion of 3 left-handed subjects (Cells 5A, 5B).
Similarly, Fig. 5, Cell 1C, shows regions in which controls’
activation exceeded patients’ during wins (from Table 8), and Cell
1D shows the reverse (patient.control) contrast. Again, the
complete absence of patient.control activity in Cell 1D carries
down after adjustment for ADHD and depression (Cell 2D), or
after we excluded smokers (Cell 3D), or medicated subjects (Cell
4D), or left-handers (Cell 5D).
Finally, the shadowgram of Fig. 5, Cell 1E, shows that during
losses controls’ activation exceeded patients’ in no regions,
whereas many areas were activated in the patient.control
contrast (Cell 1F). These differences persisted when we adjusted
for ADHD and depression (Cells 2E, 2F), or when we excluded
smokers (Cells 3D, 3F) or left-handers (Cells 5D, 5F). The pattern
was broken only after we excluded 10 medicated subjects; then,
among the remaining 10 there was greater activation in right
superior frontal gyrus (BA6) among controls, compared with
patients (Cell 4E). However, that single finding, relying on only 10
subjects and an average of 23 DecBa-DirBa trials, does not negate
our conclusion: it appears unlikely that these potential confounds
explain the large patient-control neural-activation differences that
we report.
Discussion
In this fMRI study we investigated the hypothesis that, while
deciding between doing a risky or a cautious behavior, or while
experiencing wins or losses from risky choices, youths with ASD
would have different brain activation patterns than community-
control boys. Important design features included an adolescent
sample with very serious antisocial and substance problems, a z-
shim procedure to enhance orbitofrontal imaging, and a novel task
Table 4. Patients’ loci of activation during decision-making.A,B
Structure Brodmann Area or SideC Cluster Size in Voxels Maximum ActivationD t
x y z
Caudate, putamen, NAc R 169 14 22 210 11.1
Putamen, NAc L 58 216 18 210 7.9
ACCE Mainly R 24, 32 929E 6 28 34 15.3
Med Fr GyE Mainly R 6 0 16 50 8.9
Sup Fr GyE R 8 2 14 56 9.3
Inf Fr Gy R, L 47 R 184; L 109 36 18 28 12.6
Midbrain (SN, VTA) R 18 4 214 210 8.5
Midbrain L 10 26 212 218 8.0
Midbrain R 11 4 226 26 8.5
Clusters ,10 voxelsF - 5 - - - -
Total Activated Voxels - 1493 - - - -
Abbreviations: As in Table 3.
Footnotes
AProcedure for determining significance, as in Table 3.
BContrast examined: (DecBa)Pt - (DirBa)Pt.
CIf bilateral, the largest maximum is shown.
DMontreal Neurological Institute coordinates, mm from anterior commissure.
ERegions bearing the same superscript comprise one activated cluster.
FCombined volume of all clusters comprising ,10 voxels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012835.t004
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that compared risk-taking trials with almost-identical risk-free
trials. We discuss three main findings.
Patients’ Neural Hypoactivity During Decision-Making
While deciding between doing a risky or a cautious behavior,
patients’ brains showed extensive neural hypoactivity. Koob
and Volkow [33] predicted that during protracted abstinence
addicts would show ‘‘disrupted activity of frontal regions, includ-
ing dorsolateral prefrontal regions, cingulate gyrus, and orbito-
frontal cortex’’, a disruption ‘‘hypothesized to underlie their
impaired inhibitory control and impulsivity … [contributing] to
relapse’’.
Table 5. Loci activating significantly more in controls than in patients during decision-making.A,B
Structure Brodmann Area or SideC Cluster Size in Voxels Maximum ActivationD t
x y z
Sup Fr GyK R10 344K 21 54 6 3.8
Mid Fr GyK R10 32 50 6 4.1
Med Fr GyL L10 1724L 220 42 24 4.1
Mid Fr GyL L11 224 38 26 2.8
ACCL L 24,32 224 34 18 4.1
ACCL R,L32 0 36 20 3.5
InsulaL L13 246 22 14 3.4
ClaustrumL L 224 20 12 3.5
ACCM R24, 32 444M 12 20 36 3.7
Med Fr GyM R9 20 36 24 2.9
CaudateN R 137N 19 24 6 3.1
PutamenN R 20 10 22 3.2
Insula R13 245 32 26 22 2.8
Mid Fr Gy R6 169 32 22 48 3.7
Amygdala R 118 22 28 212 3.2
Med Fr GyO L6 278O 216 210 58 4.0
Sup Fr Gy (Pre-SMA)O L6 218 26 68 3.8
Pre-Central GyO L4 216 226 60 3.7
Med Fr GyP R6 369P 18 216 60 3.5
Sup Fr Gy (Pre-SMA)P R6 22 214 71 4.2
Mid Temp Gy R21 121 50 224 214 3.8
Hippocampus L 157 234 232 212 3.6
Post-Central Gy L3 154 260 216 50 3.6
Post-Central GyQ L3 387Q 232 236 52 3.4
Inf Parietal LobuleQ L40 232 252 58 3.2
Sup Temp Gy L41 206 242 236 6 3.9
PrecuneusR L31 256R 220 246 30 4.0
Cing GyR L31 220 246 28 3.0
Supramarginal Gy R40 175 60 254 26 3.5
Lingual Gy R19 126 30 258 2 2.9
Ant Lobe L 154 28 246 232 3.4
Uvula VermisS R 327S 6 262 236 5.1
Culmen VermisS R 2 262 230 3.6
Post Lobe Cerebellar TonsilS R 16 260 248 4.2
Post Lobe Pyramis Vermis L 342 210 276 234 4.1
Total Activated Voxels - 6233 - - - -
Abbreviations: As in Table 3.
Footnotes
AContrast examined: (DecBa-DirBa)Ctr - (DecBa-DirBa)Pt.
BProcedure for determining significance: For voxel-wise uncorrected p,0.005 Monte Carlo simulations indicate that whole-brain clusterwise threshold p,0.05
(corrected for multiple comparisons) requires .96 clustered voxels.
CIf bilateral, the largest maximum is shown.
DMontreal Neurological Institute corrdinates, mm from anterior commissure.
K-RRegions bearing the same superscript comprise one activated cluster.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012835.t005
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Per those predictions, our patients activated about 4-fold fewer
voxels than controls during decision-making (Tables 3 and 4).
Group comparisons with a cluster-based threshold found almost
6000 voxels more activated in controls than patients (Table 5), and
none more activated in patients than in controls. As in the Koob-
Volkow predictions, while making decisions patients activated
right DLPFC and bilateral ACC, as well as left OFC (medial
frontal gyrus, BA 10) significantly less than controls (Table 5).
DLPFC generates ‘‘higher order cognitive processes that regulate
the selection among multiple competing responses and stimuli’’
[59]. It is part of a complex ‘‘executive’’, ‘‘control’’ [18], or
‘‘STOP’’ [64] system that, among other things, inhibits behavior.
ACC monitors rewards and punishments, signaling DLPFC to
adjust behavior to maximize future rewards [60]. Dysfunction in
those regions could contribute to disinhibited antisocial and drug-
using behaviors.
Figure 3. Selected regions more activated in one group (patients or controls) than in the other. Regions significantly more activated in
controls than in patients: Left column, during decision-making (cf. Table 5 for contrast and details); middle column, while experiencing wins (cf.
Table 8 for contrast and details). Regions significantly more activated in patients than in controls: right column, while experiencing losses (cf. Table 11
for contrast and details). Row 2: left is at bottom. Rows 3–6: left is at left. Values of ‘‘y’’: for slices in that row, distance (mm) rostral (+) or caudal (2)
from anterior commissure. Numbered regions: 1, middle frontal gyrus BA 10; 2, middle temporal gyrus BA 21; 3, medial frontal gyrus BA 9; 4, uvula
(vermis) and pyramis; 5, medial frontal gyrus BA 10; 6, middle frontal gyrus BA 11, 47; 7, anterior cingulate BA 24, 32; 8, middle frontal gyrus BA 11; 9,
superior frontal gyrus BA 8; 10, middle frontal gyrus BA 11, 47; 11, anterior cingulate BA 24; 12, putamen; 13, superior temporal gyrus, BA 38; 14,
insula BA 13; 15, superior temporal gyrus BA 22; 16, middle frontal gyrus BA 6; 17, insula BA 13; 18, amygdala; 19, middle and inferior temporal gyri
BA 21; 20, inferior temporal gyrus BA 21.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012835.g003
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However, the activation difference between our groups
extended well beyond the frontal regions predicted by Koob and
Volkow [33]. We next suggest that, along with DLPFC, OFC, and
ACC, patients’ decision-related hypoactivity in other regions
(Table 5) may contribute to their faulty real-life decision-making.
While making decisions patients had hypoactivity in insula,
which usually co-activates with ACC. Via widespread connections
[65] insula integrates current internal feelings with past memories
to guide goal-directed behavior [66]. Insula may assess risks before
behavior selections, evaluating possible losses or punishments and
signaling the probability of aversive outcomes [66–71]; it activates
in anticipation of risk in betting games [72]. Insula’s anatomic
volume is reduced among children with conduct disorder [27].
As behaviors are learned, becoming habitual, their control
gradually shifts to caudate and putamen, ‘‘the core neurobiological
substrate of both goal-directed and habitual control of instrumen-
tal responding’’ [73]. Caudate frequently activates with risk
decisions [74]. Caudate and putamen were hypoactive among
patients during decision-making.
Amygdala, together with OFC and NAc, processes cues that
predict positive or negative outcomes in goal-directed behavior,
guiding decisions with cue-induced positive and negative emo-
tional memories [75]; amygdala damage impairs the use of
emotional memories as animals choose among behaviors [76].
Dysfunction in amygdala and associated temporal cortical regions
are considered central to psychopathy [23]. Meanwhile, hippo-
campus processes memories of environmental (‘‘contextual’’) cues
[75] to guide behavior. Alcoholic parents’ at-risk offspring have
reduced amygdala and hippocampus volumes even before
significant alcohol use [29], and children with conduct disorder
also have reduced amygdala volumes [27,28]. Amygdala,
hippocampus, and temporal cortical structures all were hypoactive
as patients made decisions (Table 5).
Also hypoactive was patients’ pre-supplementary-motor area
(pre-SMA), which projects to ACC, insula, lateral prefrontal
regions, caudate, and putamen [77]. Using that network pre-SMA
integrates choice or volition with organized movement. Many
subjects reported shifting response strategies during CBG, and pre-
SMA activates as subjects switch between different stimulus-
response rules. Pre-SMA also activates more before self-selected
movements (such as DecBa responses) than before externally-
commanded ones (like DirBa responses).
Post-central gyrus (BA 3), middle occipital gyrus (BA19), and
inferior parietal lobule (BA40) all activate during risk-taking tasks
[74]. Deficits in inferior parietal lobule may contribute to antisocial
behavior [50]. All were hypoactive as our patients made decisions.
BA31 (including cingulate gyrus and adjacent precuneus) is part
of a broad posteromedial cortex [78,79] with very wide
Figure 4. DecBa BOLD activity minus DirBa BOLD activity during yellow-light decision periods for patients and controls. Mean DecBa-
minus-DirBa values are shown for patients, and separately for controls, in brain regions with significant control-patient differences (see Table 5). Negative
deflections in some regions indicate that subjects’ mean activity there was less during DecBa than during DirBa. Some regions extend across several
anatomical structures. Some structures appear more than once because they contained more than one activated cluster. SPM activation units: see
Methods. Abbreviations: Ant, anterior. Gy, gyrus. Med, medial. Pre-SMA, region immediately anterior to the supplementary motor area. Sup, superior.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012835.g004
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connections. BA31 therefore has ‘‘the means to influence, and be
influenced by, an extensive network of cortical structures involved
in processing highly integrated and associative information’’; it
appears to influence ‘‘notion of self’’ [78], including ‘‘first person
perspective-taking and experience of agency’’ [79], functions
relevant in behavior-inhibition disorders. BA31 was hypoactive
during patients’ decision-making.
Interconnected with PFC, cerebellum (especially midline
vermis) has an executive role in planning, problem solving,
working memory, and mental flexibility [80]; cerebellar damage
may produce disinhibition, inappropriate comments, and impul-
sivity. Cerebellum was hypoactive as patients made decisions.
An unexpected contribution to patients’ relative neural
hypoactivity during decision-making was that in numerous areas
DecBa generated less BOLD activity than DirBa, resulting in a
negative DecBa-minus-DirBa difference (Fig. 4). DecBa required
complex choices. DirBa, a low-demand comparison, required only
simple motor responses to simple directions. Nevertheless, in
several key brain regions patients’ neural activity was stronger
during DirBa than during DecBa (Fig. 4). This apparently was not
due to elevated DirBa activation in patients; DirBa activation, as a
percentage of mean activation in all brain voxels, was similar for
patients and controls. So among youths with ASD it appears that
(in comparison to simple directions) risky-choice opportunities
Table 6. Controls’ loci of activation during Wins.A,B
Structure Brodmann Area or SideC Cluster Size in Voxels Maximum ActivationD t
x y z
Mid Fr Gy L 10 109 236 56 12 5.2
Sup Fr GyH R 10 8618H 34 58 22 6.9
Mid Fr GyH R 11 24 54 210 6.6
Sup Fr GyH R 9 24 52 38 7.0
Mid Fr GyH R 46 40 46 10 4.8
ACCH R, L 32 0 44 12 4.6
ACCH R, L 24,32 0 36 30 6.3
ACCH R, L 33 0 20 24 4.9
Mid Fr GyH R 9 38 28 40 5.3
Sup Fr GyH R 6 6 23 59 4.6
Inf Fr GyH R, 47 40 22 212 5.4
Mid Fr GyH R 8 40 20 52 5.1
Med Fr GyH Mainly R 8 2 18 52 5.0
Mid Fr GyH R6 38 4 62 4.9
CaudateH R 18 10 16 5.5
PutamenH R 28 2 6 6.5
AmygdalaH R 24 212 12 3.4
Inf Fr Gy L 47 151 240 22 212 5.0
ThalamusI L 530 22 10 12 3.5
Cing GyI R, L 23, 31 0 234 34 3.7
CaudateJ L 1068J 220 8 18 5.6
Inf Par LobuleJ L 230 230 42 3.9
Caudate Tail R 146 36 234 24 5.0
Inf Par LobuleK Mainly R 40 R 1653K; L 137K 48 244 50 6.2
Supramarginal GyK R40 42 248 38 6.1
Sup Par LobuleK R 7 32 274 52 4.1
Pyramis, Tonsil, Uvula L 504 240 268 244 7.1
Declive, Culmen R 115 38 266 228 3.7
Cuneus R19 144 6 282 36 4.0
Inf/Mid Occ Gy R 18 355 34 292 28 4.4
Total Activated Voxels - 13530 - - - -
Abbreviations: As in Table 3.
Footnotes
AProcedure for determining significance: as in Table 5.
BContrast Examined: (DecBa Rt-Resp Win Trials)Ctr - (Paired DirBa Rt-Resp Trials)Ctr.
CIf bilateral, the largest maximum is shown.
DMontreal Neurological Institute coordinates, mm from anterior commissure.
H-KRegions bearing the same superscript comprise one activated cluster.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012835.t006
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Table 7. Patients’ loci of activation during Wins.A,B
Structure Brodmann Area or SideC Cluster Size in Voxels Maximum ActivationD t
x y z
Mid Fr GyL R 10 2649L 22 52 26 4.7
Sup Fr GyL R 10 38 52 18 5.0
Mid Fr GyL R 11 22 48 214 4.3
Sup Fr GyL R9 44 36 38 4.1
Mid Fr GyL R8 36 22 48 4.8
CaudateL R 18 8 20 3.4
Inf Fr GyM R 47 790M 42 20 214 7.6
AmygdalaM R 26 2 217 3.4
PutamenM R 28 0 22 4.9
Inf Fr Gy L 47 345 238 20 28 5.1
Putamen L 117 230 212 0 3.9
Mid Fr Gy R 6 173 28 4 64 4.0
Precentral Gy L 6 776 242 22 32 3.7
Thalamus L, R 374 4 24 10 3.2
Sup Parietal LobO R, L 7 R 788O; L 359O 42 260 58 6.1
PrecuneusO R, L 32 274 52 3.0
Uvula R, L 139 26 268 244 4.2
Cereb, Post Lobe, Declive R, L 106 22 278 216 4.2
Total Activated Voxels - 6616 - - - -
Abbreviations: As in Table 3.
Footnotes
AProcedure for determining significance: as in Table 5.
BContrast Examined: (DecBa Rt-Resp Win Trials)Pt - (Paired DirBa Rt-Resp Trials)Pt.
CIf bilateral, the largest maximum is shown.
DMontreal Neurological Institute coordinates, mm from anterior commissure.
L-ORegions bearing the same superscript comprise one activated cluster.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012835.t007
Table 8. Loci activating significantly more in controls than in patients during Wins.A,B
Structure Brodmann Area or SideC Cluster Size in Voxels Maximum ActivationD t
x y z
ACC R, L, 24, 32 215 2 34 20 4.01
Sup Temp Gy L 22, 38 103 248 8 26 4.66
Sup Temp GyP R 22 168P 54 26 28 3.78
Mid Temp GyP R 21 54 28 218 2.85
Inf Temp GyP R 21 58 210 218 2.84
Precuneus R 31 105 20 272 22 3.67
Fusiform GyQ R 19 286Q 22 266 214 4.23
DecliveQ R 30 262 222 3.83
Declive L 102 228 264 226 3.58
Total Activated Voxels - 979 - - - -
Abbreviations: As in Table 3.
Footnotes
AProcedure for determining significance: as in Table 5.
BContrast Examined: [(DecBa Rt-Resp Win Trials)Ctr - (Paired DirBa Rt-Resp Trials)Ctr] - [(DecBa Rt-Resp Win Trials)Pt - (DirBa Rt-Resp Trials)Pt].
CIf bilateral, the largest maximum is shown.
DMontreal Neurological Institute coordinates, mm from anterior commissure.
P-QRegions bearing the same superscript comprise one activated cluster.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012835.t008
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actually reduced BOLD activity in some regions, perhaps contrib-
uting to these youths’ frequent real-life risk-taking. Whether risk-
free choices similarly would reduce neural activity among patients
remains a question for future research.
Patients’ Dysphoria, Reward Insensitivity, and Loss
Hypersensitivity
Compared with controls, patients registered greater dysphoria
on both a depression scale and an anxious-depressed scale
(Table 1), and their BOLD responses showed both reduced
sensitivity to reward and heightened sensitivity to punishment.
Koob and Volkow [33], reviewing studies of drug self-adminis-
tration by animals, find consistent evidence for both hypodopa-
minergic reward insensitivity and CRF-related activation of a
brain stress system, and they propose that in human addicts these
processes manifest as subjective dysphoria.
Experiencing Wins. While experiencing wins, controls
activated numerous structures, including a single massive, mainly
right-sided cluster involving DLPFC, VLPFC, OFC, ACC, dorsal
striatum, and amygdala (Table 6). During wins, although patients
Table 9. Controls’ loci of activation during Losses.A,B
Structure Brodmann Area or SideC Cluster Size in Voxels Maximum ActivationD t
x y z
ACC R, L, 24,32 1716 4 38 20 8.1
Sup Fr Gy R, L 6 384 10 4 72 5.7
Inf Fr GyM R 47 504M 42 14 210 5.9
Sup Temp GyM R 38 36 14 226 3.3
InsulaM R 13 40 12 24 5.5
Inf Fr Gy L 38, 47 267 236 20 120 6.1
Midbrain (SN/VTA)N R, L 412N 0 230 28 6.0
Culmen, Ant LobeN R, L 26 238 214 3.3
Tuber L 104 234 260 238 4.3
Total Activated Voxels - 3387 - - - -
Abbreviations: As in Table 3.
Footnotes
AProcedure for determining significance: as in Table 5.
BContrast Examined: (DecBa Rt-Resp Loss Trials)Ctr - (Paired DirBa Rt-Resp Trials)Ctr.
CIf bilateral, the largest maximum is shown.
DMontreal Neurological Institute coordinates, mm from anterior commissure.
M-NRegions bearing the same superscript comprise one activated cluster.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012835.t009
Table 10. Patients’ loci of activation during Losses.A,B
Structure Brodmann Area or SideC Cluster Size in Voxels Maximum ActivationD t
x y z
ACCO R, L, 24, 32 2114O 0 26 36 8.2
Sup Fr GyO R 9 22 34 38 3.2
Med Fr Gy0 R, L 9 2 34 36 5.2
Inf Fr Gyp L 47 301p 242 18 214 5.7
Sup Temp Gyp L 38 238 18 224 3.3
Sup Temp GyQ R 38 613Q 32 12 234 5.6
Inf Fr GyQ R 47 36 16 218 5.1
Sup Fr Gy R 6 257 24 6 58 4.5
Midbrain (SN/VTA)R R, L 290R 2 234 28 4.3
Ant Lobe CulmenR R, L 4 246 22 5.3
Total Activated Voxels - 3575 - - - -
Abbreviations: As in Table 3.
Footnotes
AProcedure for determining significance: as in Table 5.
BContrast Examined: (DecBa Rt-Resp Loss Trials)Pt - (DirBa Rt-Resp Loss Trials)Pt.
CIf bilateral, the largest maximum is shown.
DMontreal Neurological Institute coordinates, mm from anterior commissure.
O-RRegions bearing the same superscript comprise one activated cluster.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012835.t010
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also activated many of these structures, they activated only about
half as many voxels (Table 7). Patients activated no regions more
than controls. Meanwhile, controls activated ACC significantly
more than patients (Table 8); ACC monitors reinforcements
unexpectedly delivered or omitted, signaling lateral PFC to adjust
behavior to maximize rewards [60]. Disruption of that signaling
may relate to patients’ real-life repetition, despite frequent
punishment, of antisocial and drug-using behaviors. Controls also
exceeded patients in activating temporal and parietal association
regions, precuneus, fusiform gyrus, and cerebellum (Table 8),
regions known to process reward-related stimuli [23,81–83].
These ‘‘win’’ findings further support the Koob-Volkow [33]
arguments. Patients showed the predicted dysphoria (Table 1; cf.,
Fig. 1) and the predicted reduction in ACC activity (Table 8).
Patients’ widespread brain hypoactivity during win experiences
reflected ‘‘reward insensitivity’’.
In familiar tasks the dopaminergic NAc and midbrain VTA/SN
regions typically activate with stimuli that predict a reward, rather
than upon reward delivery [84]. Thus, as expected, our patients
and controls did not activate these regions upon reward delivery
(Tables 6, 7). Instead, in both groups the regions activated in
anticipation of reward, during the yellow-light decision period
(Tables 3, 4). But strikingly, those BOLD responses in the two
groups were not significantly different (Table 5). Apparently, they
similarly processed reward anticipation in NAc and VTA/SN, and
that may appear to challenge suggestions of patients’ reward
insensitivity. However, VTA/SN also project to caudate and
putamen, regions recently recognized as important in reward-
based decision making [85], and those regions did activate
significantly less in patients than in controls during the yellow-
light period of decision-making and reward anticipation (Table 5);
patients were relatively insensitive to reward anticipation there.
Why then did the NAc BOLD response of the two groups not
differ during reward delivery? First, in a well-learned task like ours
reward delivery generates little BOLD response in reward circuits
[84], and fMRI may be insufficiently sensitive to detect possible
group differences there. Second, among adults with impulsive and
aggressive traits rewards generate enhanced BOLD responses in
dopaminergic reward circuits [32]. Our patients had impulsive
and aggressive traits (Table 1), predicting enhanced reward-circuit
function [32], and they also were addicted, predicting diminished
reward-circuit responses [33,18]. Perhaps reflecting both opposing
influences, our patients’ reward-related neural activity in NAc did
not differ from controls’.
Complicating the concept of reward insensitivity among patients
is that they and controls rated themselves similarly ‘‘happy’’ upon
winning in the CBG (Fig. 2D). Although the VAS was sufficiently
sensitive to detect different emotional responses to win-vs.-loss, it
may not have been sensitive enough to detect different emotional
responses of patients and controls to wins. It also may be that
‘‘reward insensitivity’’ in human beings is not a short-term
emotional response to a series of individual rewarding events,
but a cumulative failure of such events to raise one’s overall mood
from sustained dysphoria. Future research may clarify this
question.
Experiencing Losses. As the two groups experienced losses,
patients’ BOLD responses to loss exceeded controls’. Controls
activated no regions more than patients; meanwhile, patients
activated right DLPFC and left OFC, as well as brainstem,
cerebellum, and temporal and parietal structures, more than
controls (Table 11). Koob and Volkow [33] propose that addiction
activates a CRF-dependent brain stress system and imposes
reward insensitivity. Our findings extend those predictions,
indicating that ASD youths also develop loss hypersensitivity,
Table 11. Loci activating significantly more in patients than in controls during Losses.A,B
Structure Brodmann Area or SideC Cluster Size in Voxels Maximum ActivationD t
x y z
Sup Fr Gys L 10 430s 28 62 30 3.5
Sup Fr Gys R 9 8 50 34 3.2
Med Fr GyS R 9 12 46 30 3.7
Sup Fr GyS R 8 22 38 44 3.2
Mid Fr GyS R 8 18 24 46 3.7
Mid Fr Gy L 11, 47 108 234 38 28 4.0
Mid to Inf Temp Gy L 21 114 258 26 222 4.2
Brainstem, PonsT L 115T 216 226 230 4.2
CulmenT L 220 234 226 3.3
Paracentral LobuleU R 31 111U 2 232 46 3.5
Cing GyU R 31 6 234 40 3.9
Mid Temp Gy L 21 128 258 240 26 3.2
Mid Temp Gy R 39 120 46 264 20 2.8
Precuneus L 7 107 24 262 44 3.8
Total Activated Voxels - 1233 - - - -
Abbreviations: As in Table 3.
Footnotes
AProcedure for determining significance: as in Table 5.
BContrast examined: [(DecBa Rt-Resp Loss Trials)Pt - (DirBa Rt-Resp Loss Trials)Pt] - [(DecBa Rt-Resp Loss Trials)Ctr - (DirBa Rt-Resp Loss Trials)Ctr].
CIf bilateral, the largest maximum is shown.
DMontreal Neurological Institute coordinates, mm from anterior commissure.
S-URegions bearing the same superscript comprise one activated cluster.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012835.t011
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perhaps facilitated by a hyperactive stress system, and further
contributing to subjective dysphoria.
Another View. Despite its great value, functional imaging
provides an incomplete assessment of neural function [86]. A
different interpretation of our data could be that patients have a
fast, automated reward response that recruits few cognitive-control
resources and allows unconstrained pursuit of rewards, a ‘‘reward
hypersensitivity’’. Conversely, controls could have a fast, effective,
automated response to punishment, while patients, generating a
less effective response, need to call upon other processing
resources. Our data cannot rule out this explanation, but the
data better fit the Koob- Volkow [33] formulation. Built on
extensive animal and human studies of addiction, that formulation
accounts for drug-impaired prefrontal cognitive functions, drug-
induced activation of a CRF stress system, drug-altered
stimulation thresholds in reward circuits (reward insensitivity),
and subjective dysphoria.
Similar Risk-Taking among Patients and Controls
Although our patients were in treatment for unconstrained real-
life risk-taking, substantiated with measures of pathological
aggressiveness, impulsiveness, and substance, legal, and conduct
problems (Table 1), and although in laboratory tasks such youths
take more risks than controls [14,15], patients and controls did not
differ in risk-taking during CBG. In a similar task adult
psychopaths made more risky responses than non-psychopaths,
but that difference was eliminated when the experimenters
required 5 seconds of deliberation before responses [87]. CBG’s
required 4-sec pre-response deliberation similarly may have
reduced patients’ excessive risk-taking. CBG’s immediate rewards
and punishments, punishments larger than rewards, and escalating
frequency of punishments also may have limited risk-taking.
However, despite behaving similarly, while processing risky
decisions and their consequences, patients and controls clearly
deployed different neural resources. Moreover, that behavioral
similarity meant that the groups experienced similar numbers of
wins, and of losses; that experimental advantage assured that
neither group had greater frustration and different brain activity
because of more losses.
Limitations
Various concerns and criticisms may limit conclusions from our
data. First, a patient-control socioeconomic status (SES) difference
(Table 1) might have made our monetary rewards more important
to patients than to controls. However, although the ‘‘happy-sad’’
self-ratings for wins differed significantly from those for losses
(Fig. 2D), happy-sad ratings did not differ by group, suggesting
that group SES differences did not strongly influence them.
Second, higher attention-deficit scores among patients might
suggest that their neural hypoactivity during decision-making and
Figure 5. Influences of ADHD, depression, tobacco smoking, prescription medications, or handedness on control-patient group
differences. Right sagittal view. Explanation in Methods and Results.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012835.g005
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winning reflected mere inattention. We think this unlikely. First,
patients’ mean reaction time (Table 2) did not differ from
controls’. Also, although patients were significantly less likely to
respond in the required time, the actual difference was very small
(mean 1.1 responses in 90 trials; p = 0.049).
Third, our design could not dissect apart the roles of drugs and
non-pharmacologic (e.g., genetic) influences on our findings. Had
we collected ‘‘pure’’ samples of youths with CD but not SUD, and
SUD but not CD, we might have appeared to address that issue.
However, the very strong comorbidity of CD and SUD means that
such groups would be comprised of quite atypical cases, from
whom findings could not generalize widely. Meanwhile, our
patients resembled those who commonly present in clinical
settings, to whom our findings do generalize. However, future
studies should consider the probable heterogeneity in patients like
ours.
Fourth, patients had widespread dysfunction in many brain
structures. We cannot identify one, or a few, structures responsible
for ASD.
Fifth, considered alone, patients’ weaker neural responses
during decision-making, or during wins, might have reflected
some general inability to generate BOLD responses. However,
patients had stronger BOLD responses to loss than controls
(Table 11). Apparently, depending on win-or-loss stimulus
conditions, patients were able to generate strong hemodynamic
responses.
Sixth, did our AlphaSim [51] thresholds adequately minimize
false-positive results? In the decision period, the win period, and
the loss period we considered both control.patient, and
patient.control, contrasts. For each period some 1000 to 6000
voxels exceeded the AlphaSim threshold in one contrast (Tables 5,
8, 11), while zero voxels did so in the other. These repeated
findings of zero activation strongly suggest a low prevalence of
false positives, while repeated findings of zero-vs.-considerable
activation in the paired comparisons do suggest real group
differences. Also, our AlphaSim-generated cluster threshold was
similar to others recently published [88; also see 52–57]. AlphaSim
findings apparently have validity.
Seventh, jittered fixation screens between the green-light
response and the red-light win-or-loss periods (Fig. 1B) might
better have deconvolved hemodynamic curves, minimizing the
influence of prior events on win-or-loss images. However, we
avoided such jittering because it would variably delay reinforce-
ments and punishments, unpredictably affecting response learning.
Fortunately, all wins, and all losses, were preceded by an identical
decision to make a right-hand response, and by its execution,
assuring a similar hemodynamic carry-over for wins and losses.
This similar carry-over could not explain why, for example, wins
produced weaker, and losses produced stronger, neural responses
in patients, compared to controls.
Eighth, our decision analyses used all 90 decision trials. Because
our win and loss analyses each examined only about 25 trials
(Fig. 2B), their lower power strongly calls for replication.
Finally, of course, data from boys cannot be generalized to girls.
Clinical Implications
Extensive research suggests that adolescent ASD is a genetically-
initiated, drug-exacerbated, persisting disposition to make risky
antisocial and substance-use decisions. Our findings suggest that
abnormal neural processing of risky decisions, rewards, and losses
may contribute to these patients’ frequent, dangerous relapses
[89]. Such patients can improve during, and for some months
after, treatment [90], but the brain abnormalities reported here
may persist into adulthood [21], leaving these patients continually
vulnerable to substance and antisocial relapse.
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